

Review of Discussions Abroad

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Following is a statement by Secretary Muskie before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 30, 1980.

I find myself coming before you with the chronic complaint of a Secretary of State: a great deal of territory to cover in a very short time. In fact, that has been the story of my life over the past 2½ months. Today I want to bring you up to date on my activities—particularly my recent discussions abroad.

Before I turn to those travels, however, let me say a few words about three matters which shaped those discussions: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; the holding of American hostages in Iran; and the negotiating process in the Middle East.

Afghanistan

First, Afghanistan. I need not dwell on the history. The President and others have made our view clear: The Soviet invasion is not only an assault on the people of Afghanistan; it also assaults fundamental principles of international order and decency. It raises serious potential threats to world peace and to vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf area.

For all these reasons, the United States has reacted firmly. We imposed restrictions on grain, high technology, and phosphate exports to the Soviet Union. We boycotted the Moscow Olympics and helped persuade 59 other countries to do likewise. We have encouraged and joined the widespread condemnation of the Soviet invasion by the international community. We have called for a complete

withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and for a political solution to the crisis.

What should be the elements of such a political settlement? In our view, four are essential:

- A prompt and complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces;
- Nonintervention in Afghan internal affairs by any outside state;
- A government acceptable to the Afghan people; and finally,
- An independent and nonaligned Afghanistan.

We are prepared to explore transitional arrangements aimed at restoring peace to Afghanistan. Such arrangements could be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

But we see no indication that the Soviet Union is interested in anything other than imposing its military grip upon that country. Our judgment is that the "withdrawal" announced last month is only a partial redeployment of troops—mostly of units not suitable to this kind of war. The Soviet announcement has not been followed by any steps which indicate that the Soviets are prepared to discuss a political solution. Indeed, if anything, fighting appears to have intensified in recent days. The resistance of the Afghan people continues to grow.

So we believe it is essential to keep up the pressure; to maintain the sanctions; to impose continuing costs upon the Soviet Union for its aggression. We will continue to urge other nations to stand firm. And we will continue to draw attention and seek support for the plight of more than 1 million Afghan refugees now homeless in Pakistan and Iran.

Iran

In Iran the continued holding of American hostages and continuing revolutionary chaos contribute further to instability in the region and prolong the crisis between our two countries. Iran's leadership is diverted by this manufactured crisis from dealing with the real threats to its independence and security.

At this point, we simply cannot say what, if any, effect the recent death of the Shah might have on the situation. Key Iranian leaders, however, say that this will have no impact on their decision to release the hostages. We continue to press, through every avenue open to us, for an early release of the hostages. And we continue to impose economic sanctions designed to impress upon Iran's leaders the costs of the crisis to their own interests. Most of Iran's major trading partners have broadly supported a policy of isolating Iran.

At the same time, we have made it clear that once our hostages are free, we and the world stand ready to deal with Iran on a basis of mutual respect. It is the holding of hostages that keeps Iran from enjoying better relations in the world.

The new Iranian Parliament is organizing. We can have some hope that if the internal power struggle within Iran can be resolved somewhat, the outlook for release of the hostages will improve. Now and in the weeks ahead, we will use every diplomatic source to urge Iranian leaders to end the crisis.

I wish I could report that the recent release of Richard Queen has hopeful implications for the other 52 hostages. In

wever, we simply can't speculate. Such efforts will not bring us any closer to peace. encouraged that the Iranian audience looked with compassion on the lone hostage; we hope that they the fundamental human dimension the entire situation and move to release the remaining 52. Iranian leaders have said they have 'rel with the people of America. must realize that as long as the are held, it is the people of who demand their release. It is ke Richard Queen and his family e suffered, and who will rejoice e crisis has ended.

Last

area of continuing concern is the last. The Camp David accords of resent an historic step toward he treaty between Egypt and Is- nnes to bear fruit; it has di- the danger of war in the Middle

re expected, the negotiations ng autonomy for the inhabitants st Bank and Gaza have proved and complex. But there are hope- Our negotiating team has been ion, engaged with the Israelis 'gyptians in intensive dis- of legal, economic, and security well as the broad outlines of an t. In these talks, both sides onstrated a new seriousness of nd a willingness to consider roaches to the difficult issues in.

talks continue in this positive xpect that the heads of delega- meet again with Ambassador [Personal Representative of the for the Middle East Peace Ne-] toward the middle of August. ntinue to do all in our power in s ahead to bring about an t on autonomy for the inhabi- West Bank and Gaza; an t which must take full account security concerns and which lead to a significant and ange in the situation of the is.

king to advance real negotiat- unities, we will be firm in our st one-sided resolutions on the st at the United Nations, such just put forward at the special he General Assembly. That was totally unbalanced. It did ledge Resolution 242 as the peace settlement. It did not srael's right to exist. We voted and were pleased that a sub- mber of other members felt not support the resolution.

Such efforts will not bring us any closer to peace.

Another principle clearly applies to our negotiating effort. It is this: While negotiations are being pursued, all of the parties must avoid unilateral actions designed to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations or that would have the effect of worsening the atmosphere for successful negotiations. No negotiations can succeed if one of the parties at the table attempts simultaneously to gain unilateral advantage on the ground.

If the parties should fail, or if the Camp David process should be derailed by misguided interventions, the consequences could be serious indeed. For the interests of the entire world are deeply engaged in the Middle East. Continuing conflict in the region threatens those interests; threatens the future of our friends in the region; threatens intervention by outside powers—and threatens the peace of the world.

Recent Discussions

I begin by mentioning these three serious situations because they have formed the backdrop for many of my recent foreign policy discussions—and those of the President—here and abroad.

Venice. Afghanistan, for example, was clearly the most urgent political topic on the agenda at the recent summit meeting in Venice. I want to report briefly on the Venice meeting, and on subsequent discussions in Ankara, where the NATO ministers gathered; in Kuala Lumpur, where I met with the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian Nations; and in Tokyo, where President Carter paid his respects to the late Prime Minister Ohira and met with Premier Hua Guofeng of China.

The most publicized results of the Venice summit were the joint economic and energy declarations made by the chiefs of state; indeed, economic and energy issues took up two of the three summit discussion periods. Energy, in fact, occupied more than 75% of the economic agenda. The result of the discussion was a strong, forthright, unambiguous agreement by the major industrial nations to pursue certain goals individually and in concert. The chiefs of state agreed to work toward significant reductions within this decade in their dependence on foreign oil; to press major energy conservation efforts; and to use energy sources other than oil where possible: coal, nuclear, synthetic, and renewable energy sources.

The Venice discussions covered economic topics also, principally inflation, the foreign exchange market, and the serious economic problems of the less developed countries.

I will not attempt to repeat what has already been said in the communiqués. Let me simply underscore what we see as the major achievement of these economic discussions. First, they represent a new departure—a concerted effort by the industrial nations to analyze their economic problems together and to set joint goals for solving them. Second, the communiqués are consistent with, and indeed reinforce our own energy and economic policies.

The political discussions at Venice were marked by similar unity. On the eve of the summit, the Soviets announced their intended troop withdrawal. The Western response was prompt and firm. The leaders challenged the Soviet Union to undertake a complete, not cosmetic, withdrawal if it wished to heal the breach caused by the Afghanistan invasion.

Let me mention briefly another aspect of the Venice summit which was of great concern to the United States: the initiative of the European Community on the Middle East. The United States—before, during, and after the Venice meetings—has worked hard to make one point clear: that we welcome initiatives which support the Camp David process, and we strenuously discourage initiatives which might undermine that process.

Having made these points clear, I welcomed the statement of Italian Prime Minister Cossiga that the European Community wants to support the Camp David process. Last week, the nine European foreign ministers decided to ask Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East. We understand that this is a fact-finding mission to enable the European Community to obtain a clearer picture of thinking in the Middle East on the peace process.

As that exploration goes forward, the position of the United States remains clear and firm: We believe the effort of the Europeans will be most constructive if it builds on the ongoing negotiations. We would welcome broader participation in those negotiations. But we believe it would be a profound mistake to encourage a solution which cannot be negotiated, or to ignore the central fact that the complex political realities are already being addressed in the autonomy negotiations.

Ankara. Immediately after the Venice summit, I flew to Ankara for the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the first such meeting in Turkey

modernization plans. We and our allies regard this as a success for our dual commitment to seek a stable military balance while pursuing arms limitations.

We are now preparing for these preliminary exchanges. We will be consulting closely with our allies before meeting with the Soviets. Once SALT II has been ratified—a goal to which we remain firmly committed—these preliminary exchanges can lead to formal negotiations and, we hope, meaningful limits on theater nuclear forces in the SALT III framework.

We believe that the wisdom of our policy—a policy of firmness and willingness to pursue cooperative arrangements—has been confirmed by events. It is important to understand that it is also the basic approach of our allies. The Soviet Union will make a great mistake to think that it can separate us from our allies on fundamental issues. The results of Venice and Ankara make this point clear, and Chancellor Schmidt's statements on his visit to Moscow reinforce the point.

Let me be candid. We and our allies did undergo a difficult period several months ago. We encountered difficulty because we encountered a situation that was unprecedented. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a challenge to our common interests although not to our collective territory. As we searched for ways to make a coherent response to that new challenge, there were differences among us.

We have emerged from that difficulty. In Venice and Ankara, the allies

showed themselves capable of moving—and speaking—together. We signaled the Soviets that we are serious about Afghanistan and about the larger issue of fidelity to the rules of international conduct.

Today the allies stand together on issues of interest that lie beyond the alliance area. And certainly we stand together when it comes to the defense of that area. NATO's commitments of recent years are ample evidence of this: the Long-Term Defense Program, the joint commitment to increase real defense spending by 3% each year, the decision last December to redress the theater nuclear balance in Europe by deploying new missiles and by seeking negotiations to limit missile forces.

It will remain a central problem to prevent the Soviets from dividing our alliance—and to head off the tempting but dangerous illusion that Europe can remain a stable island of detente while the Soviets create dangerous situations elsewhere. Dealing with this problem will require vigorous and subtle diplomacy; it will call for patience and wisdom from the American people. But we are on the right path.

This government is committed to a foreign policy that is at once strong and generous. We are pursuing the most ambitious military program in two decades. But we will resist becoming locked into a

cycle of renewed arms competition—for a new unbridled arms race would threaten America domestically while not increasing our security.

We are working with our allies in an atmosphere of mutual concern and support. But we reject the illusion that we can—or should—return to the kind of domination we enjoyed when our allies were still recuperating from World War II.

We are firmly opposing Soviet adventurism. But we have no interest in a policy of knee-jerk hostility which sees a Russian under every Third World stone.

Finally, we are working to build peace and stability—in Africa, in the Middle East, in Central America, and other troubled regions.

In each of these areas, we have received the understanding and cooperation of this committee and your support for the resources necessary for success. I welcome that continued support. For I am convinced that these are the best policies for today and for the decade to come. And I am convinced they reflect the opinion and the will, the realism and good sense, of the great majority of the American people. ■

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